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1. Introduction 
Supply chains consist of readily recognizable linkages, often between commercially distinct 
organizations that must coordinate activities to ultimately meet customer demand.    Such 
organizations are not necessarily bound by a central planner who can both determine and 
dictate what procurement policies are implemented across these inter-organizational links.  
In the absence of such coordination, each organization can be expected to resolve 
procurement and replenishment policies from a local perspective, passing the demands of 
such to its suppliers in a highly intuitive, pull-style fashion.  While such policies may seem 
reasonable to all partners involved and may be the only solutions tolerable from a political 
perspective, there exists the possibility that the decentralized policies are operating at a 
combined cost substantially higher than that which could be achieved through global 
optimization.  The purpose of this chapter is to define this vulnerability and to suggest 
methods for anticipating it, both in the simulation modelling of supply chains and in 
practice  
Efforts to characterize the vulnerability of inter-organizational links arguably predates the 
phrase 'supply chain'.  As much of the early work on multi-stage inventory planning was 
being accomplished, Bowersox (1969) protested the inherent assumption of vertical 
integration in the formulation of many distribution problems, warning of inefficiencies that 
could arise in practice if, in fact, various stages represented distinct organizations.  Working 
with small multi-stage networks, Schwarz & Schrage (1975) coined the phrase system myopic 
to identify policies in which inventory replenishment is planned locally, the connation of 
which implies potential weakness (the condition of near-sightedness) when conducted in a 
complex system.  Nonetheless, supply chain literature has traditionally maintained what 
Otto & Kaab (2003) would later call the operations research perspective, relying heavily on the 
assumption that policies will be set by central decision-makers to optimize the performance 
of complex systems. 
The reality of inter-organizational dynamics in supply chain management has gained 
greater attention in recent years, highlighted in the taxonomy of Wang (1995) as a nexus of 
contract perspective on operations.  The supply chain literature survey by Stadtler (2005) cited 
globally dispersed inter-organizational chains as a challenge central to this field.  Disparities 
between centralized and decentralized procurement policies for specific instances are being 
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explored mathematically, such as for the relationship between a single retail outlet and its 
warehouse when demand for a particular product depends both on price and level of retail 
stock (Jørgensen & Kort, 2002), or for a single assembly operation supported by multiple 
suppliers each of which suffer uncertain component yields (Gurnani & Gerchak, 2007). To 
enable centralized solutions among independent organizations, information sharing emerges 
as an important issue in this context, such as the work summarized in the survey of Huang 
et al. (2003). Given that an inter-organizational supply chain is structured such that all 
relevant information required to achieve a centralized solution is not reliably available, 
development of decentralized, negotiation-based schemes to approximate the benefit of the 
operations research perspective has received attention, such as the coordination processes 
developed for two-tier systems by Dudek & Stadtler (2007). 
Yet surprisingly, practitioner surveys such as that of Armistead & Mapes (1993) have 
suggested confounding inconsistencies in the reported usefulness of intuitively beneficial 
mechanisms such as information sharing in practice. Some simulation studies modelling 
these issue have echoed this theme, such as the counter-intuitive findings of Lau et al. 
(2004), in which all stages of a simulated supply chain did not always need to be engaged in 
information sharing to achieve satisfactory system performance. Furthermore, it is not 
uncommon for studies modelling system-wide cost performance under various assumptions 
of information sharing and inventory management (for example, the serial inventory 
systems in Chen (1998)) to suggest the average superiority of centralized solutions to be as 
little as 2%.  This has sparked debate as to whether such a gap is of any practical significance 
at all, such as the commentary of Hofmann (1997) and Aderohumnu et al. (1997) concerning 
the degree of improvement apparent in more centralized algorithms for solving a dyadic 
buyer/supplier lot sizing problem. 
Wang et al. (2004) discuss further drawbacks inherent in the operations research perspective 
on supply chain systems, such as ignoring the facts that the cost of information processing 
for centralized planning may be expensive, the system may be too complex to readily 
identify optimal solutions, and that competitive behaviour between independent stages may 
exclude the use of such solutions even if available. Nonetheless, the paradigm of the central 
planner and the optimal solution is the pursuit the most efficient operation of the entire 
supply chain system, and each of the concerns outlined by Wang et al. (2004) could be 
addressed with effort and investment.  Simultaneously, there exists ample evidence that the 
potentially costly interventions required to operate a decentralized system in a centralized 
fashion would not always result in profoundly better results. Gavirneni (2001) observes that 
the benefits of information sharing and central coordination appear to depend heavily on 
environmental factors such as the supply chain structure and its existing modus operandi, 
but there remains little insight from the current literature on precisely what these factors are 
and how they influence these benefits. This leaves unanswered the question that, in the 
presence of independent supply chain partners, when would a substantial effort to restore 
the operations research perspective of the system make a substantial difference in the 
system's performance? Can it be anticipated which supply chains will prove most 
vulnerable to inefficiencies induced by decentralized pull-style planning, distinguishing 
them from those for whom elaborate contractual arrangements and information sharing do 
little to improve performance beyond what is achieved through their own intuitive local 
optimization? These are the issues examined in this chapter, beginning with proposed 
measures for the degree of disparity between the quality of centralized and decentralized 
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supply chain solutions, discussed as various forms of friction in the next section.  Friction is a 
direct measure of the degree of benefit of the centralized planning of procurement between 
two or more supply chain stages. After discussion of the concept of friction in its general 
form in Section 2, mathematical formulations of friction in two-stage and three-stage 
systems with level, deterministic demand are developed in Section 3, so that these models 
may then be utilized in the simulation of 127,680 experimental instances, representing a 
broad range of environmental factors described in Section 4.  Section 5 details the results of 
the simulation study, employing descriptive statistics, polynomial and logistic regression, 
and graphical representations to explore the intricate interactions of various factors in 
determining the relative robustness or extreme inefficiency of decentralized, pull-style 
planning.  Section 6 provides further discussion and interpretation, including intriguing 
results such as those supply chain partners most vulnerable to higher system costs through 
decentralized planning are those partners most similar to each other in general cost 
structures and independent order cycle preference. 
2. Proposed measures of supply chain vulnerability 
To focus on potential vulnerability inherent in any inter-organizational supply chain 
arrangement, we introduce these five concepts: 
• friction- the disparity between the cost of a decentralized solution and that of an 
optimal solution when conducting procurement across a supply chain structure. 
Friction represents the loss, if any, suffered by local optimization among otherwise 
independent supply chain partners.   Friction is stated as a ratio of a decentralized to an 
optimal solution’s value.  Thus, it is assumed that friction can be no less than 1.0 for any 
given instance. 
• link friction- friction observed between two partners, a buyer and a supplier. 
• chain friction- friction observed in generalized supply chain structures consisting of 
three or more partner stages. 
• implicit optimization-  an environmental instance in which a supply chain structure 
suffers no friction.  These are conditions under which local optimization results in 
solutions identical to the policies dictated by global optimization.  Thus, implicit 
optimization is the equivalent of a value of 1.0 for the ratio friction. 
• economic blind spot- an environmental instance resulting in extreme friction, so named 
because the independently operated supply chain partners fail to “see” the substantial 
savings associated with another solution.  This is an alarming vulnerability that could 
potentially be anticipated by identifying the environmental factors associated with its 
occurrence. 
Link friction and economic blind spots are simple to demonstrate.  Consider the two-stage, 
dyadic structure pictured in the upper left-hand corner of Fig. 1, representing the 
partnership between a single buyer and supplier.   
Consider a case in which the buyer consumes or distributes 210 units of the supplier’s 
product each period, incurring a fixed cost of 200 to procure any number of units and 
paying 1.0 to hold one such unit in inventory for one period.  The supplier incurs a fixed 
cost of 600 to replenish the stock at the level below, and 0.95 per unit per period in inventory 
costs.  In decentralized planning, the buyer will prefer to order lot-for-lot, as it costs more to 
carry one period’s worth of demand in inventory than it does to place a new order with the 
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supplier.  With heavier fixed costs and somewhat lesser inventory costs, the supplier will 
then minimize cost by replenishing once every three periods.    
Using a 12-period planning horizon as an example, the buyer will incur a total cost of 12 * 
200  = 2,400, while the buyer would pay 4 * 600 = 2,400 in fixed costs and 4 * 598.5 = 2,394 in 
inventory costs.  This results in a total system cost of 7,194, which is not an optimal solution 
in this setting.  Despite the fact that this solution is highly intuitive to the two independent 
partners, the lowest cost solution dictates that both the supplier and the buyer replenish 
once every three periods.  In this scenario, the buyer would pay only 4 * 200 = 800 in fixed 
costs but 4 * 630 = 2,520 in inventory holding costs, while the supplier would pay the same 4 
* 600 = 2,400 in fixed costs, but hold no inventory after serving the buyer. The total 
combined system cost is only 5,720.  This discrepancy between the two scenarios is 
expressed as link friction of 7,194/5,720 = 1.258, or a cost increase of nearly 26% attributable 
to decentralized planning, and a distinct economic blind spot in this partnership. 
Now consider the same two-stage scenario, but with the following revisions:  the buyer 
consumes or distributes 190 units per period (as opposed to the original 210), and the 
supplier’s per unit, per period inventory holding cost is 0.55 (as opposed to the original 
0.95).  Now the solution arrived at through decentralized planning is identical to the optimal 
solution to this scenario:  the buyer will prefer to replenish every two planning periods and 
supplier, supporting the buyer's consumption pattern, will replenish every four periods.  
This scenario represents implicit optimization, in that centralized planning can not improve 
upon the decentralized activities of two independent partners. 
3. Formulation 
3.1 Two-stage formulation 
To express friction mathematically in the context of discrete, deterministic and level 
demand, consider the following definitions concerning the two-stage dyadic system 
illustrated in Fig. 1: 
d = the per period external demand requirement.   
hi = the per unit, per period inventory holding cost at stage i. 
si = the fixed cost of replenishment (ordering cost) at stage i. 
T = the length of the planning horizon. 
λ1 = the order cycle length of stage 1, stated in periods.  
λ2 = the order cycle length of stage 2, stated as a multiple of λ1. 
At stage 1 we expect T/λ1 order cycles within a planning horizon of T periods, with an 
implicit assumption that T/λ1 is an integer.  Likewise, we expect T/(λ1λ2) order cycles at 
stage 2, and thus total ordering costs of the two stage scenario can be stated: 
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Figure 1. Four supply chain structures 
To express the issue of inventory burden, consider the fact that each order cycle at stage 1 
requires d(λ12 - λ1)/2 part periods of inventory, and thus each stage 2 order cycle incurs 
λ12d(λ22 - λ2)/2 part periods of inventory.  Incorporating the respective holding costs and the 
number of order cycles yields an expression of the combined inventory holding costs for the 
two stages: 
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The latter half of expression (3) does assume a “one-to-one” demand relationship between 
the two stages; i.e. demand for d items from stage 1 results in the procurement of precisely d 
input items from stage 2.  This highly convenient assumption can be made without loss of 
generality, in that any exception to this condition (i.e. two identical components are secured 
from stage 2 to support the provision of a single item for external consumption at stage 1) 
can be translated back into the former case by simply “kitting” the multiple components 
together and adjusting the associated holding cost.   
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Thus, the combined relevant cost of any policy of λ1 and λ2 can be stated as: 
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To further simplify expression (5) and to highlight the roles of certain environmental cost 
factors that will later prove influential to the issue of friction, consider the following 
additional definitions: 
p = the ratio s2/s1. 
e = the ratio h2/h1. 
D = (dh1)/2. 
Environmental cost factor p is an expression of the magnitude of the stage 2 fixed cost s2 
relative to the corresponding cost at the stage 1, or s2 = s1p.  Similarly, environmental cost 
factor e allows the per unit per period holding cost at stage 2 to be stated in terms of the 
corresponding cost at stage 1, h2 = h1e.  Introducing these relationships into expression (5) 
yields: 
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At this point, the introduction of factor D yields: 
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To formulate the issue of link friction, it becomes necessary to discriminate between two 
policies, that which results specifically from decentralized planning versus an optimal 
policy with respect to minimizing expression (7).  Therefore, we revise the definitions of 
order cycle lengths λ1 and λ2 to read: 
λ1 = the order cycle length of stage 1 which minimizes costs at stage 1, stated in periods.  
λ2 = the order cycle length of stage 2 which minimizes costs at stage 2 (given a value of λ1), 
stated as a multiple of λ1. 
λ*1 = the order cycle length of stage 1 in a globally optimal solution, stated in periods.  
λ*2 = the order cycle length of stage 2 in a globally optimal solution, stated as a multiple of 
λ*1. 
Link friction, being the ratio of decentralized to optimal planning, can then be expressed as: 
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At this point we observe that link friction is essentially independent of planning horizon 
length T, and expression (8) can be simplified to: 
 ( )
( )
))1()1((
))1()1((
2
*
1
*
1
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
211
21
21
−+−++
−+−++
λλλλλ
λ
λλλλλ
λ
eD
ps
eD
ps
 
 
 
(9) 
 
The symbolic derivation of friction in a two-stage system now reaches an impasse, in that 
there exist no closed form expressions to further substitute for the order cycle factors λ1 , λ2 , 
λ*1 and λ*2, translating expression (9) into a statement of friction as a function solely of 
environmental parameters s1, D, p and e.   
3.2 Extensions of the two-stage formulation 
3.2.1  Equivalent environmental instances.  
Expression (9) demonstrates infinite environmental instances will share the same associated 
level of friction, due to the composite nature of the parameter D.  Since D represents dh1/2, 
a scenario in which s1=100, p=2, e=0.5, h1=1.0 and d=50 can be anticipated to have the same 
associated friction as a scenario in which s1=100, p=2, e=0.5, h1=0.5 and d=100, and so on.  
3.2.2 General two-level supply chain structures.   
Expression (9) not only represents an infinite number of environmental cases with 
equivalent link friction, this expression also calculates the chain friction associated with a 
special case of the generalized two-level structure, such as the two-level, four-stage system 
pictured in Fig. 1.  In such a structure, the receiving level is populated only by stage 1, with 
the same parameters s1, d and h1 discussed early in Section 3.1.   The supplying level, 
however, is populated by n stages numbered i = 2, … , n+1, each with an associated fixed 
cost of si and holding cost hi, resulting in a potentially unique λi  and λ*i for that stage.  The 
combined fixed ordering costs of the system, the general two-level equivalent of expression 
(1), appears as: 
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Likewise, the combined inventory holding cost of the two level system, the generalized form 
of expression (3), would be: 
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Similar to the arguments of Section 3.1, expressions (10) and (11) can be combined and 
simplified to yield the total relevant cost of the two-level system as: 
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Now consider a special case of the two-level system, in which the supplying stages are 
identical in cost structure.  Thus, each second level stage incurs a particular fixed cost s’2  
and a particular per unit per period holding cost h’2  associated with its replenishment 
cycles.  Since each supplying stage likewise experiences the same level of demand from 
stage 1, all supplying stages would be observed to implement  identical order cycles, in both 
decentralized (λ’2) and globally optimal  (λ’*2) planning of the system.  Introduction of this 
condition into the general decentralized case represented by expression (12) yields: 
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Following the definition of experimental factors p and e from the previous Section, let p’ = 
s’2/s1 and e’ = h’2/h1.  Introducing the three factors p’, e’, and D into expression (13) yields: 
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At this point, it is apparent that expression (14) is the equivalent to the two-stage expression 
(7), for any p = np’ and e = ne’.  Thus, expression (9) calculates not only the link friction 
between a buyer and a supplier  stage, but likewise the chain friction between a buyer and n 
supplier stages with homogenous cost factors such that p’= p/n and e’= e/n. 
3.3  Three-stage formulation 
Extending the formulation to three stages in serial formation (such as pictured in Fig. 1) is 
simply a matter of appending the third stage to the model in Section 3.1 with the addition of 
these factors: 
 
λ3 = order cycle length of stage 3 which minimizes costs at stage 3 (given a value of λ1λ2), 
stated as a multiple of λ1λ2. 
λ*3 = order cycle length of stage 3 in a globally optimal solution, stated as a multiple of λ*1λ*2. 
 
The logic behind defining the order cycle length of stage 3 as a multiple of λ1λ2 is that any 
stage’s order cycle length is measured relative to the order cycle length of its parent, or buyer 
stage above.  Stage 1 has no parent item to supply, the equivalent to an order cycle being 
imposed on it in the form of external demand is one period in length.  In the decentralized 
case, total ordering costs for the system can be stated as: 
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Each order cycle at stage 3 will require λ12 λ22d(λ32 – λ3)/2 part periods of inventory.  Thus, 
total inventory costs for T periods throughout the system is: 
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Expressions (15) and (16) can then be combined and simplified to create a model of total 
system cost analogous to the two-stage case in expression (5): 
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The earlier definitions of cost ratio factors p and e featured in the two-stage formulation in 
Section 3.1 must now be expanded to indicate which pair of stages the factors refer to.  Now 
let: 
p1 = the ratio s2/s1. 
p2 = the ratio s3/s2. 
e1 = the ratio h2/h1. 
e2 = the ratio h3/h2. 
Now the total three-stage system cost can be stated as: 
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As with any other structure linking more than two stages, chain friction is understood to be 
the ratio of a decentralized versus an optimal three-stage policy: 
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(19) 
3.4 Three-level extension of three-stage formulation 
Analogous to the relationship between the two-stage and two-level system, the three-stage 
serial formulation can be shown to represent special cases of more general three-level 
models, such as the three-level, eight-stage system pictured in Fig. 1.  Consider such a 
system, consisting of top-level stage 1, n second level stages numbered 2 through n+1, and m 
third level stages numbered n+2 through n+m+1.  Let i* represent the parent of stage i, also 
known as its immediate successor or its buyer.  As with the two-level formulation, all 
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second level stages have stage 1 as their parent stage, thus i* = 1 for i = 2 through n+1.  
Expression (12), the total relevant cost of ordering policies in the context of a two-level 
system, can now be expanded to model three-level structures: 
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Now assume a specialized structure such that stages 2 through n+1 on the second level have 
identical cost parameters h'2 and s'2, and thus identical associated parameters e'1, p'1, and λ'2.  
Likewise, stages n+2 through m+1 on the third level are assumed to have identical cost 
parameters h'3 and s'3, and thus identical associated parameters e'2, p'2, and λ'3.  Following an 
algebraic progression analogous to expressions (13) and (14) in Section 3.2, the total relevant 
cost of this particular three-level assembly structure can be restated: 
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Expression (21) is the equivalent to the three-stage expression (18), for any p1 = np'1, p2 = 
mp'2/n, e1 = ne’1, and e2 = me’2/n.  Thus, expression (19) calculates not only chain friction for a 
three-stage serial system, but likewise the chain friction associated with a general three-level 
assembly structure with n second-level supplier stages with homogenous cost factors such 
that p’1= p1/n and e’1= e1/n, and m third-level supplier stages with homogenous cost factors 
such that p’2= p2n/m and e’2= e2n/m. 
4. Computational experiments 
4.1 Two-stage link friction test bed 
The two-stage link friction test bed consists of 63,840 numerical experiments exploring the 
level of link friction concerning procurement between two simulated supply chain actors 
over a broad range of environmental factors.   The policies associated with local versus 
central planning, (λ1, λ2) versus (λ1*, λ2*), are identified through line searches employing 
segments versus all of expression (7).  Link friction, the outcome of interest, is then 
calculated with expression (9).   
The size of the test bed is driven by the objective of testing each of the environmental factors 
required in the formulation of expression (7) over a broad range of values.  Factor s1, the 
fixed cost of replenishment associated with the receiving stage, is varied from 25 to 200 at 
intervals of 25, while the fixed cost ratio p ranges from 0.25 to 3.0 at intervals of 0.25.  
Holding cost factor e is tested at values selected from 0.05 to 0.95, at intervals of 0.05, and the 
factor D is tested from 25 to 220, at intervals of 5.  Thus, 7 S1 levels * 12 p levels * 19 e levels * 
40 D levels = 63,840 experimental instances of link friction. 
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While the size of the 63,840 experiment test bed is intended to test friction levels over a 
broad range of environmental parameters, these 63,840 actually model an infinite number of 
scenarios of both link friction (as discussed in Section 3.2.1), and the chain friction associated 
with more general two-level structures with homogenous costs at the second level (as 
discussed in Section 3.2.2). 
4.2 Three-stage chain friction test bed 
The three-stage chain friction test bed consists of 63,840 numerical experiments exploring 
the level of chain friction between three simulated supply chain actors arranged in a serial 
configuration such as pictured in Fig. 1. In these experiments, factors p1 and p2, defined in 
Section 3.3, are assumed to be equal in value, and thus can be represented as environmental 
factor p = p1 = p2. Likewise, inventory holding cost factors e1 and e2 are set equal to each 
other, thus a single numerical factor e = e1 = e2 can be tested.  The purpose of this assumption 
is to create a test bed design in which each of the 63,840 three-stage instances are directly 
analogous to a two-stage link friction instance.  Thus, experimental factors p, e, D, and s1 
were all tested at the same levels described for the two-stage test bed in Section 4.1.  In these 
experiments, the policies (λ1, λ2, λ3) versus (λ1*, λ2*, λ3*), are identified through simple line 
searches employing expression (18).  Chain friction is then calculated with expression (19).  
As with the two-stage test bed, these 63,840 experiments arguably model an infinite number 
of scenarios, including more general three-stage structures with the homogenous cost 
assumptions discussed in Section 3.4. 
5. Numerical results 
Simulation of the experiments described in Section 4 results in a total of 127,680 
experimental instances of friction.  Section 5.1 begins by outlining the summary statistics 
associated with friction levels observed within the two-stage and three-stage test beds.  
Section 5.2 follows with discussion of the results in terms of implicit optimization, or 
instances in which no loss is observed through decentralized planning.   Section 5.3 explores 
the influence of the various environmental parameters on friction levels in general, and 
Section 5.3 focuses on typifying those observed instances of extreme friction, or economic 
blind spots, in particular. 
5.1 Summary statistics 
5.1.1 Two-stage link friction.  
The 63,840 experimental instances in the two-stage link friction test bed exhibited an average 
friction of 1.03, as presented in Table 1. 42,277 of these instances, or 66% of the testbed, are 
examples of implicit optimization, in that an optimal solution to the experimenatal instance 
proved no better than a decentralized solution, resulting in a link friction of 1.0.  However, 
embedded in the averages displayed in Table 1 are also 1,308 instances of link friction of at 
least 1.2.  The maximum friction value observed was 1.317, indicating a 31.7% penalty in 
total cost incurred when the buyer stage plans first in that instance.  Fig. 2 shows how 
friction, on average, responds to the ratio s1/D, an environmental factor first shown to be 
significant in the earlier study by Simpson (2007).    As parameter D=dh1/2, the ratio s1/D is 
the equivalent of (2s1)/(dh1).  Further interpretation of s1/D will be discussed in later 
sections. 
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 s1=50 s1=75 s1=100 s1=125 s1=150 s1=175 s1=200 Averag
e
p=0.25 1.003 1.002 1.004 1.004 1.007 1.006 1.008 1.005 
p =0.50 1.006 1.006 1.010 1.012 1.018 1.018 1.022 1.013 
p =0.75 1.009 1.011 1.017 1.020 1.029 1.030 1.037 1.022 
p =1.00 1.011 1.014 1.022 1.027 1.037 1.040 1.048 1.029 
p =1.25 1.013 1.017 1.026 1.032 1.042 1.047 1.056 1.033 
p =1.50 1.014 1.018 1.028 1.035 1.046 1.051 1.059 1.036 
p =1.75 1.014 1.020 1.030 1.037 1.048 1.053 1.059 1.037 
p =2.00 1.014 1.020 1.030 1.038 1.049 1.053 1.057 1.037 
p =2.25 1.014 1.021 1.031 1.038 1.049 1.051 1.055 1.037 
p =2.50 1.014 1.021 1.031 1.039 1.048 1.049 1.053 1.036 
p =2.75 1.014 1.021 1.031 1.038 1.046 1.048 1.051 1.036 
p =3.00 1.014 1.021 1.031 1.038 1.044 1.046 1.049 1.035 
Average 1.012 1.016 1.024 1.030 1.038 1.041 1.046 1.030 
Table 1.   Link friction associated with two-stage  test bed, n= 63,840 experiments 
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Figure 2. Interaction of link friction and the ratio s1/D for two- and three-stage test beds. 
5.1.2  Three-stage chain friction 
The 63,840 experimental instances in the three-stage chain friction test bed exhibited 
generally higher friction than their two-stage counterparts, as is apparent in Fig. 2. Table 2 
provides the summary of friction analogous to that provided for the two-stage cases in Table 
1. 
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 s1=50 s1=75 s1=100 s1=125 s1=150 s1=175 s1=200 Averag
e
p=0.25 1.004 1.003 1.006 1.006 1.010 1.009 1.012 1.007 
p =0.50 1.011 1.012 1.019 1.023 1.032 1.034 1.041 1.025 
p =0.75 1.018 1.024 1.037 1.045 1.059 1.065 1.075 1.046 
p =1.00 1.024 1.037 1.052 1.065 1.080 1.086 1.091 1.062 
p =1.25 1.031 1.046 1.066 1.077 1.087 1.087 1.088 1.069 
p =1.50 1.037 1.055 1.074 1.079 1.082 1.080 1.080 1.070 
p =1.75 1.042 1.063 1.074 1.074 1.075 1.073 1.074 1.068 
p =2.00 1.048 1.065 1.069 1.069 1.070 1.069 1.071 1.066 
p =2.25 1.052 1.063 1.065 1.063 1.065 1.066 1.070 1.064 
p =2.50 1.055 1.060 1.061 1.060 1.062 1.064 1.068 1.061 
p =2.75 1.054 1.056 1.057 1.056 1.059 1.061 1.064 1.058 
p =3.00 1.053 1.053 1.054 1.053 1.057 1.059 1.061 1.056 
Average 1.036 1.045 1.053 1.056 1.062 1.063 1.066 1.054 
Table 2.   Chain friction associated with the three-stage test bed, n= 63,840 experiments 
Only 26,627 experimental instances resulted in implicit optimization, or 37% less than 
associated with the two-stage test bed.  Friction ranged as high as 1.466 in some instances, 
with 4,896 instances of at least 1.20, representing 7.7% of all experiments. 
5.2 Anticipating implicit optimization 
5.2.1 Two-stage test bed 
To explore the factors associated specifically with implicit optimization, or the lack of 
friction, multivariate logistic regression analysis was employed to model that binary 
condition.  Models associating the presense of implicit optimization with the various 
environmental factors as independent variables were run in SPSS with binary logistic 
regression (against the dependent variable of implicit optimization), using the Wald 
Forward selection method. This method selects only significant variables with the strongest 
correlation to the dependent variable.  Pseudo r2 values were then calculated to test the 
amount of variability explained and concordance and discordance measures were 
undertaken. As the full model displayed in step 5 of Table 3 indicates, every environmental 
parameter tested in this study is implicated in the issue of implicit optimization, although 
the majority of the explanatory power of this sorting scheme is captured in the smaller step 
3 model relating implicit optimization to factors e, s1/D, and p.   As suggested by the 
findings, as of step 5, implicit optimization can be isolated within the test bed by calculating 
the logit of probability of friction, -4.970 + .031s1 + 1.000p + 5.932e - .033D - .602s1/D, for each 
experimental instance. A negative result predicts implicit optimization. 42,161 experimental 
instances return such a result, of which 87.7% of these are indeed instances of implicit 
optimization. The overall friction level of this group is only 1.006, although this model 
incorrectly indentifies 27 distinct economic blindspots, or instances in which friction was at 
least 1.20.  The balance of the testbed, 21,679 instances, are assumed to involve friction, 
although 24.5% of these are likewise instances of implicit optimization misclassified by the 
regression equation.   
 
www.intechopen.com
 Supply Chain: Theory and Applications 
 
528 
 Step 1 
Coeff. 
Step 2 
Coeff. 
Step 3 
Coeff. 
Step 4 
Coeff. 
Step 5 
Coeff. 
 
Constant 
-2.710*** 
[.067] 
(.024) 
-4.216*** 
[.015] 
(.034) 
-5.870*** 
[.048] 
(.003) 
-7.357*** 
[.001] 
(.061) 
-4.970*** 
[.007] 
(.067) 
 
e 
3.750*** 
[42.520] 
(.038) 
4.415*** 
[82.722] 
(.043) 
4.791*** 
[120.447] 
(.046) 
5.033*** 
[153.455] 
(.048) 
5.932*** 
[376.914] 
(.056) 
 
s1/D 
 .763*** 
[2.145] 
(0.010) 
.828*** 
[2.290] 
(0.010) 
.633*** 
[1.883] 
(0.011) 
-.602*** 
[.548] 
(.017) 
 
p 
  .796*** 
[2.217] 
(.013) 
.838*** 
[2.313] 
(.013) 
1.000*** 
[2.718] 
(.015) 
 
s1 
   .012*** 
[1.012] 
(.000) 
.031*** 
[1.031] 
(.000) 
 
D 
    -.033*** 
[.968] 
(.000) 
Model Chi Square 12125 20628 24890 27402 35473 
Nagelkerke r-Square .240 .383 .447 .484 .591 
Model Significance .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
% Implicit Optimization 
Correctly Predicted 
 
82.8 
 
86.0 
 
88.6 
 
88.9 
 
89.4 
% Instances of Friction >1 
Correctly Predicted 
 
44.1 
 
54.6 
 
61.7 
 
64.9 
 
71.8 
Overall % Correct 69.7 75.4 79.5 80.8 83.4 
Table 3.  Results of forward stepwise (Wald) regression model of implicit optimization in 
two-stage test bed.   Odds Ratio listed in square brackets[], with standard error in curved 
brackets().    *** Significance 1% 
Despite the statistical significance of the full model, its associated r² is only 59.1%, a 
disappointing value from the perspective of predictive power.  Furthermore, the logitistic 
regression equation itself is difficult to interpret in broad contextual terms.  Nonetheless, 
this analysis, coupled with a series of graphical observations, suggests a simpler scheme for 
discriminating between instances of implicit optimization and friction. Approximately 65% 
of all instances of implicit optimization in the link friction test bed can be identified through 
the sequential application of three intuitive rules: 
• s1/D ≤ 0.5.  This requirement identifies 10,260 experimental instances, each with a link 
friction of 1.0.  s1/D ≤ 0.5 implies that s1 ≤ 0.25dh1 indicating that the fixed cost at the 
first stage is no more than one-quarter the cost of holding a single lot of demand for one 
period.  Restated, this rule identifies those instances in which fixed costs at the buyer 
stage are so small that the buyer’s independent decision to order lot-for-lot is 
simultaneously the decision a central planner would reach. 
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• s1/D ≤ .990 - .458*ln(p).  This requirement identifies 13,623 experimental instances 
(when applied after the first requirement), 7 of which have an associated link friction of 
1.003 and the balance being perfect implicit optimization.  This rule uses the factor p = 
s2/s1  to collect instances in which the environmental cost factors associated with the 
buyer are significantly greater than that of the supplier, thus there is little or no loss to 
allowing the buyer to dictate the plan. 
• s1/D ≤ 1 - .507*e.  Applying this requirement after the two rules identifies 3,527 
experimental instances with an average friction of 1.0007, as 96% of this group 
represents implicit optimization.  This rule reflects the distinctly linear inflammatory 
effect that factor e (the ratio h2/h1) has on friction.   
Application of these three rules divides the link friction test bed into two groups:  the 27,410 
instances identified by the rules, 99.5% of which are examples of implicit optimization, and 
the 36,430 remaining instances possessing overall average friction of 1.052.   
5.2.2  Three-stage test bed 
As observed earlier, friction ran higher and implicit optimization was not as common in the 
three-stage chain friction experiments.  Naïve application of the three rules developed to 
discriminate implicit optimization in the link friction case yields less impressive results 
when applied to the three-stage results:  the analogous "implicit optimization group" of 
27,410 experimental instances would be comprised of only 65% instances of implicit 
optimization and possess an overall average friction of 1.026, as opposed to the overall 
average of 1.00009 for its two-stage counterpart.       
Employing multivariate logistic regression using the Wald Forward selection method to 
model implicit optimization in the three-stage data does reveal some insight, highly similar 
to the two-stage results detailed in Table 3.  The resulting logistic regression equation in the 
three-stage case, logit of probability of friction = -3.282   + .013 s1 + 1.149p + 4.389e - .013D - 
.221 s1/D, sorts the test bed into a group of 29,050 instances of which 75.4% are implicit 
optimization, and a group of 34,790 instances containing only 13.6% implicit optimization.  
Like the previous two-stage model, this discrimitory ability, with its associated r² of 44.6% in 
the three-stage case, is surpisingly disappointing from the perspective of anticipating future 
occurances of implicit optimization.  
In contrast, a tightening of the simplified two-stage rules developed out of the original two-
stage regression analysis does yield additional insight into implicit optimization in the 
three-stage case.  To discriminate between the majority of the instances of implicit 
optimization versus non-trivial chain friction in the three-stage test bed, apply the following 
three rules sequentially: 
• s1/D ≤ 0.5 and s1p1/De1 ≤ 0.5.  2,007 experimental instances fit this description, each 
exhibiting implicit optimization.  These are environmental parameters such that both 
the first and second level stages have insubstantial fixed costs relative to inventory 
costs, and will be ordering lot-for-lot regardless of whether their schedules are decided 
independently or centrally. 
• s1/D ≤ .337 - .587*ln(p).  This requirement identifies 3,905 experimental instances with 
an average chain friction of 1.0003, 97% of which being examples of implicit 
optimization.  This restriction identifies those experimental instances for which the 
relevant costs at the first level are substantially greater than those at the second and 
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third levels, thus "top-down" planning does little to damage system performance.  Note 
that p = p1 = p2 in this test bed. 
• s1/D ≤ 2 - 3.889*e.   Subsequent application of this cut identifies 11,396 experimental 
instances with an average friction of 1.003, as 75% of these instances represent implicit 
optimization.  Note that e = e1 = e2 in this test bed.   
Application of these three rules divides the three-stage chain friction results into two 
groups, the first being 17,308 instances with an average chain friction of 1.002, 83% of these 
being instances of implicit optimization.  The balance of the chain friction test bed, 46,532 
instances, now have an average friction level of 1.074, but 26% of these instances are likewise 
examples of implicit optimization.   
5.3 Friction as a response to environmental parameters 
5.3.1 The influence of the ratio s1/D 
Fig. 2 illustrates the distinct influence of the ratio s1/D on the issue of friction in these 
supply chain structures, and this ratio has already proven invaluable to modeling much of 
the implicit optimization observed in the test beds.   As discussed previously in Section 
5.1.1, the ratio s1/D can be restated as (2s1)/(dh1).  This breakdown of the ratio is useful 
when one considers that the worst cases of friction in both test beds, economic blindspots 
that implied up to 46% increase in system costs through decentralized planning, all occured 
when s1/D was near or equal to a value of 2.0.   Restated, average friction was peaking in 
Fig. 2 when (2s1)/(dh1) = 2, or  s1/(dh1) = 1, or s1 = dh1.  In other words, friction is observed 
to peak as the cost of holding one lot of external demand at the first level balances with the 
fixed cost of replenishment at that level.  This is significant in that this represents a scenario 
in which the independent planner is logically indifferent to placing an order for that demand 
lot versus consolidating that requirement with the order for one period previously.  In these 
simulations, it was assumed that, given indifference, the decision-maker would elect to 
place the additional order, acting on the general principle of avoiding inventory. 
Fig. 2 suggests that friction peaks again to a lesser extent when s1/D achieves a value 6.0, 
which implies s1 = 3dh1.  Here the independent decision-maker at the first level is indifferent 
with respect to cost between a policy of ordering every two periods (λ1=2) versus every 
three periods (λ1=3), and thus is assumed to implement the former policy.  An earlier, 
preliminary study in Simpson (2007) suggested further but lesser peaks when s1/D neared 
values of 12 and 20, consistent with scenarios in which the first level decision-maker is 
economically indifferent between replenishing every third versus fourth period and fourth 
versus fifth period, respectively.  However, Simpson (2007) also presents evidence that this 
intriguing influence is highly dependant on the condition of smooth demand, as modelled 
here.  Intuitively, these points of indifference must be experienced repeatedly to induce the 
associated inefficiency, and highly dynamic demand with its resulting variable order cycle 
conditions rapidly mute the effect. 
5.3.2 The influence of parameters p and e   
Fig. 3 illustrates the average response of two-stage link friction to the two other 
environmental parameters observed to have profound influence on that test bed:  the ratios 
p and e, representing the ratios of the second level to first level's fixed costs and holding 
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costs, respectively.  Each point in this surface represents the average friction for n=280 
experiments across all factor levels of s1 and D for given levels of p and e, and this response 
surface is very closely modeled by the expression z (average friction) = 1.0 +0.086e2 + 0.002p2 
- 0.001p (r2 = .843). 
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Figure 3. Response surface formed by average friction levels across environmental factor 
levels p and e for two-stage test bed. 
Observation of the three-stage test results suggests similar relationships between these 
parameters and the broader effect of chain friction.   In the case of the three-stage results, the 
response surface is closely modelled by z (average friction) = 1.0 + 0.351e2 – 0.182e - 0.011p2 + 
0.043p (r2 = .879).   Furthermore, the percent increase between three-stage chain friction 
instances and their corresponding two-stage counterparts describes a highly similar 
response surface with respect to p and e, as shown in Fig. 4. 
Further insight can be gained by looking at these two environmental parameters in isolation.  
Fig. 5 shows the distinctly "inflammatory" effect of the inventory parameter e: the higher the 
levels of this factor, the higher the observed levels of friction.  Fig. 5 also indicates the 
intuitive result that this phenomenon is compounded by the addition of another level of 
planning, as the disparity between the average friction in the two-stage and three-stage 
experiments widens with increasing values of e. 
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Figure 4. Response surface formed by average percent increase in friction levels when 
comparing three-stage to two-stage experimental instances, across environmental factor 
levels p and e. 
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Figure 5.  Average friction levels across factor level e for the two-stage versus three-stage 
results (n = 3,360 instances for each data point). 
Fig. 6 illustrates average two-stage and three-stage response to the fixed cost parameter p, 
suggesting similar polynomial relationships with the issue of friction, but nonetheless in 
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contrast with the ratio e.  Unlike the inventory parameter e, the results do not support a 
strictly increasing relationship between parameter p and resulting friction.   Rather, the 
highest average levels of friction witnessed on Fig. 6 are associated with the values of 1.5 
and 2.0, and inspection of the data reveals that the absolute highest values of friction, or 
economic blind spots, are associated with somewhat lesser values of p, as will be discussed 
in the next section.  Likewise, unlike factor e in Fig. 5, the disparity between the two-stage 
and the three-stage results does not appear to be strictly increasing with the value of fixed 
cost parameter p.  
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Figure 6.  Average friction levels across factor level p for the two-stage versus three-stage 
results (n = 5,320 instances for each data point). 
5.4 Anticipating economic blind spots 
As discussed earlier, economic blind spots are so named because independent supply chain 
partners could potentially fail to "see" substantial savings achievable through centralized 
coordination.  Interestingly, the findings in the previous section suggest these instances of 
extreme friction are associated with the same environmental parameters in both the two-
stage and the three-stage test bed.   In each case, the worst of the economic blind spots are 
confined to instances in which the following conditions occur simultaneously: 
• .75 ≤ p ≤ 1.25  
• e ≥ 0.9  
• 1.33 ≤ s1/D ≤ 2.0  
These three conditions hold true for 282 experimental instances in each test bed.  In the case 
of the two-stage test bed, average friction for this sub-group is 1.219 (in contrast to 1.030 for 
the entire test bed), containing of all instances of friction of at least 1.30.  Within the three-
stage test bed, average friction of these 282 instances is 1.310 (compare to 1.054 for all three-
stage experiments), containing only 17% of the 880 three-stage experiments with chain 
friction of at least 1.30, but 100% of the 47 instances in which chain friction was at least 1.40.  
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6. Observations and conclusions 
The results of this simulation study strongly suggest that certain inter-organizational supply 
chain partnerships could prove extremely vulnerable to the inherent inefficiency of 
decentralized procurement, while others could function quite comfortably in that mode, 
dependent on environmental factors.  Thus, it is not surprising how, as discussed in Section 
1, much of the existing literature exploring the relative merits of centralized planning and 
coordination reports distinctly mixed results.  Indeed, it now becomes apparent how 
potentially dangerous it may be to draw conclusions from an average observation of interest 
in this context- the average loss from decentralized planning across these 127,680 
experiments was only 4%, but this summary conceals the presence of distinct economic 
blind spots ranging as high as 46% increases in system-wide costs. 
The new measures of link friction and chain friction discussed in Section 2 and the 
associated conditions of implicit optimization and economic blind spots assist in focusing 
attention on the relative merits of centralized planning, to rationally weigh these merits 
against any difficulties present in a given inter-organizational supply chain.  Even in the 
context of the particular simplifying assumptions incorporated into the formulations of 
Section 3, resulting friction levels showed strong relation to both the environmental factors 
tested here, and complex interactions of those factors.   The powerful influence of the cost 
factors p and e, both in the creation of instances of implicit optimization and in driving 
friction upwards, has interesting implications for simulation study design as well as 
practice.  As an example, an earlier study of Simpson (2001) examined centralized versus 
decentralized procurement across a three level system of substantially greater complexity 
than the linkages modelled in Section 3, including features such as multiple products, joint 
order-picking costs, and time variant demand.  Nonetheless, a highly centralized scheduling 
technique outperformed intuitive, pull-style planning by an average of only 1.8% across one 
group of 900 experiments, and yet this same technique lowered costs by an average of 31.5% 
within another group of 900 experiments.  In hindsight, the only environmental difference 
between these two groups were the factors identified here as e1 and e2, these values being 
substantially higher in the latter case.           
Section 5.4, outlining the environmental factor values most commonly associated with 
economic blind spots in both test beds, addresses the question posed earlier:  when would a 
substantial effort to restore the operations research perspective of a system make a 
substantial difference in that system's performance?  All three of the conditions identified in 
Section 5.4 have compelling interpretations.  The first two,  0.75 ≤ p ≤ 1.25 and e ≥ 0.9, are 
indicating those experimental instances in which the fixed replenishment costs and the 
inventory holding costs of each of the supply chain stages are the most similar to each other.  
Restated, supply chains linking independent organizations with highly similar cost 
structures may see the greatest benefits from centralized interventions, or suffer distinct cost 
increases from independent behaviour.    
However, to locate the most dramatic blind spots in this simulation study, Section 5.4 
coupled the conditions of similar fixed and holding costs with a third condition, 1.33 ≤ s1/D 
≤ 2.0.  As discussed earlier in Section 5.3.2, the ratio s1/D was found to be highly influential 
on the level of friction within a simulation, with the greatest degree of influence observed 
when this ratio’s value was at or near a value of 2.0.  This condition represents a scenario in 
which a buyer’s fixed and inventory costs balance such that, when acting independently, 
this stage would be indifferent or nearly indifferent to recieving lot-for-lot replenishment 
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versus replenishing two period’s worth of demand requirements with each in-bound 
shipment.  Thus, the presence of this condition of independent indifference to holding one 
period’s worth of inventory based on cost (it is assumed that the buyer stage would 
otherwise favor no inventory simply on principle) strongly suggests that effort should be 
invested in identifying the centralized solution on behalf of system-wide performance. 
As discussed earlier, there is evidence suggesting that the particular influence of s1/D is not 
likely to hold beyond the conditions of level demand simulated here, in that these moments 
of indifference must be repeated through time to generate the inefficiency.   Arguably, this is 
not as confining an assumption as it may first appear:  supply chains supporting Just-in-
Time (JIT) production will likely be supporting level production schedules, resulting in level 
procument patterns across in-bound partnership links.  Furthermore, as pointed out by           
Gavirneni (2001), much of the recent re-engineering of supply chain partnerships has been 
in support of JIT inventory management.  Thus, the issues of characterizing and identifying 
those supply chain relationships most vulnerable to decentralized treatment should not be 
considered simply a promising direction for further research, but a genuine and on-going 
need in the successful management of the increasingly complex systems observed in the 
field.  
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